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Comment
INFLAMMATORY PUBLICITY IN STATE
CRIMINAL CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Van Duyne, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
reviewed the conviction of a construction worker for the brutal
murder of his wife. The defendant contended, inter alia, that his
motion for mistrial should have been granted because of improper
and prejudicial stories which appeared in local newspapers while
the jury was being empaneled. 2 In affirming the conviction, the
court noted that it had examined the record of the trial and was
unable to find evidence that the newspaper articles "prevented a
fair trial or that they so infected the minds of some of the jurors
as to leave them biased against the defendant. '3  Nevertheless,
the court issued a strong and definitive warning to those con-
nected with the administration of criminal justice, particularly
attorneys, on the subject of "trial by newspaper. '4 The statement
of the court relies on the American Bar Association Canons of
Professional Ethics: 5
1 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964).
2 One such article stated that "Van Duyne was nabbed in a phone
booth by police a short time later. Police quoted him as saying, 'You've
got me for murder. I don't desire to tell you anything.'" Another
article said: "According to police, Van Duyne had been arrested at
least 10 times and had once threatened to 'kill a cop.' Authorities
reported after his arrest that Van Duyne beat up a man during the
summer in 1962 and then threatened Detective William Toomey with
a gun." None of these statements was ever proved at trial. Id. at 384,
204 A.2d at 849.
3 Id. at 386, 204 A.2d at 851.
4 For want of a better or more concise term, "trial by newspaper" will
be used often in this article and when used will refer to all news
media, not merely to the press. The material to which the term refers
includes publication of alleged confessions of the accused, past criminal
record of the accused, failure of a person to take a lie detector test,
statements of unsworn witnesses, statements dealing with tangible evi-
dence in the case, opinions of the guilt or innocence of the accused,
and any other inflammatory material, whether or not it is actually
prejudicial.
5 Canon 20, A.B.A. Canons of Professional Ethics, states: "Newspaper
publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may
interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the
due administration of justice. Generally they are to be condemned.
If extreme circumstances of a particular case justify a statement to
the public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously. An ex parte
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We interpret these canons, particularly Canon 20, to ban state-
ments to news media by prosecutors, assistant prosecutors and
their lawyer staff members, as to alleged confessions or inculpa-
tory admissions by the accused, or to the effect that the case is
"open and shut" against the defendant, and the like, or with refer-
ence to the defendant's prior criminal record, either of convictions
or arrests. Such statements have the capacity to interfere with
a fair trial and cannot be countenanced. With respect to prosecu-
tors' detectives and members of local police departments who are
not members of the bar, statements of the type described are an
improper interference with the due administration of criminaljustice and constitute conduct unbecoming a police officer. As
such they warrant discipline at the hands of the proper authorities.
The ban on statements by the prosecutor and his aides ap-
plies as well to defense counsel. The right of the State to a
fair trial cannot be impeded or diluted by out-of-court assertions
by him to news media on the subject of his client's innocence. 6
In view of the existence of Canon 20, the statement of the
New Jersey Supreme Court should not appear to be extraor-
dinary. However, it apparently is the first such statement by any
court of record in this country;7 the first indication that at last
a court intends to take an obvious step toward eliminating pre-
judicial publicity in state criminal proceedings by enforcing Canon
20.
Much has been written about the evils of, and solutions to,
the problem of trial by newspaper. It is not the purpose of this
article to attempt an exhaustive exposition of all that has been
said before, but rather to summarize the problem, to examine the
past approaches to its solution, and then to discuss the relative
merits of proposed new solutions, such as: (1) amendment and/or
enforcement of Canon 20; (2) adoption by the news media of en-
forceable codes of ethics; and (3) adoption of criminal legislation
which would punish divulgence or publication of prejudicial ma-
terial.8 All of these take on added significance in view of the
reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation from the records
and papers on file in the court; but even in extreme cases it is better
to avoid any ex parte statement."
6 43 N.J. 369, 389, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (1964).
7 It has also been stated that there is no record of a case in which dis-
ciplinary action has been taken against an attorney for acts amounting
to a violation of Canon 20. BLAusT=l & PORTER, THE AMEICAN
LAwYER 271 (1954).
8 No attempt is made in this article to deal with special problems arising
from news media coverage of the trial itself, e.g., whether to allow
photographers and television cameras in the courtroom or whether
the press has a "right" to attend all trials. For discussion of these
problems, see Freedman, News Media Coverage of Criminal Cases and
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The Van Duyne case aptly illustrates the factual aspects of
the problem of out-of-court statements and publications surround-
ing criminal proceedings. 9 If such statements and publications
were uncommon, they probably would evoke little more than
casual comment by the judiciary. Unfortunately, they are not
unusual and may be found in news media reports in all parts of
the country.'0 As Mr. Justice Frankfurter lamented, "Not a Term
passes without this Court being importuned to review convic-
tions ... because of inflammatory newspaper accounts . ... "11
It would be unnecessary and perhaps futile to attempt enumera-
tion or discussion of the many cases surrounded by publicity
similar to that in Van Duyne.12 All authorities seem to agree
that numerous criminal trials are conducted amid news media
reports of statements made out of court regarding alleged con-
fessions of the accused, 13 the accused's past criminal record,14
failure of a suspect to take a lie detector test,15 statements by
unsworn witnesses, 16 and editorial comments as to the guilt or
innocence of a defendant. 7
the Right to a Fair Trial, 40 NEB. L. REV. 391 (1961); Wright, A Judge's
View: The News Media and Criminal Justice, 50 A.B.A.J. 1125 (1964).
See also FED. R. Cum. P. 53; Canon 35, A.B.A. Canons of Professional
Ethics.
9 See note 2 supra.
10 See, e.g., Lincoln Star, Dec. 29, 1964, p. 11, cols. 5-6, containing an
article about an accused murderer and stating that the accused had
orally admitted the killings to the prosecutor, that there was evidence
of drinking prior to the killings, and that the accused had been hos-
pitalized several times for alcoholism and arrested for intoxication.
11 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961) (concurring opinion).
12 For a discussion of several cases where publicity reached a particularly
high level, see SULLIVAN, TRIAL By NEwsPAPFR (1961).
13 Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (film of defendant confessing
to sheriff shown on television); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181(1952); Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951).
14 Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959); State v. Van Duyne, 43
N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964).
15 State v. Sheppard, 165 Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
16 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
'7 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
COMMENT
B. THE Eva INVOLVED
Unfortunately, at the time of this writing, there appear to be
no conclusive reports based upon scientific evidence which indi-
cate the exact nature of the evil resulting from news media re-
porting of the type under consideration. As a result, differences
of opinion exist as to what kind of evil does result, 8 or whether
any evil at all results. 9 The latter view is a minority one, and
with regard to the nature of the evil it is sufficient to say that
there is ample evidence that the fairness and impartiality of a
trial are often threatened.20 An excellent example is Irvin v.
Dowd,21 where pretrial publicity was so intensive and prejudicial
that ninety per cent of the prospective jurors had formed some
opinion as to the guilt of the defendant.
Further evidence is found in the fact that certain kinds of
information, such as coerced confessions, past criminal records,
18 See PHi.LIPs & McCoy, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS 164 (1952),
where the authors report that two out of three lawyers polled believed
that publicity occasioned by the failure of lawyers to observe Canon
20 "has lessened the confidence of the public in the integrity and im-
partiality of the administration of justice .... " Another view is
presented in Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and
Criminal Proceedings, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 21 (1961), where it is said:
"Naturally it would be absurd to attribute the oft-mentioned decline
of moral ideals in America-a phenomenon yet to be scientifically
demonstrated-or even the rising crime rate to the sole force of
crime publicity. But a nexus strongly suggests itself. Moreover, the
effect may be not merely a blunting of the communal conscience, but
an outright perversion."
19 See, e.g., Wiggins, The Press and Conflicts of Interest, 24 FED. B.J. 358,
361 (1964): "The whole process . . . requires more scrutiny rather
than less, more publicity rather than more secrecy." The author gives
as reasons for his statement the improvement in quality and quantity
of testimony given, increased consciousness by public officials of their
duties, protection of lawyers and judges from unjust accusations, and
education of the public, all of which should not be sacrificed for the
sake of "perfect fairness" in trials. However, the author fails to show
how prejudicial publications advance any of these supposed benefits.
An office memorandum, circulated by Col. Robert R. McCormick,
Editor of the Chicago Tribune, and quoted in 38 VA. L. REV. 1057, 1070-
71 (1952), says: "For every case where newspaper reporting and
editorial comment may have prejudiced a defendant's rights, there
are thousands of cases to prove that a free press, directed by no other
'code' than its good conscience, has protected not only individual de-
fendants, but society as a whole."
20 U.S. CoNST. amend. VI, gives the defendant the right to a trial by an
impartial jury.
21 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
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and failures to take lie detector tests have generally been held to
be inadmissible as evidence at trial.2 2 Publication of this infor-
mation undermines the judicial process in two ways. First, it
exposes prospective jurors to inadmissible evidence. Second, it
destroys one of the functions of the bar in criminal cases, since
"neither counsel nor court can control the admission of evidence
if unproven, and probably unprovable 'confessions' are put before
the jury by newspapers and radio. ' 23  In addition, inflammatory
publicity may cause unnecessary delay in selecting jurors and
proceeding with the case.24
The least that may be said about the publication of sensa-
tional material and inadmissible or not-yet-admitted evidence is
that it does not aid the administration of justice. If the public
has a right to be apprised of criminal activity, this right can cer-
tainly be fulfilled by statements that a specific crime has been
committed, that a suspect is being sought, and that a certain per-
son has been arrested or charged with the crime. On the other
hand, sensational publicity has caused serious problems of unfair-
ness in the past, and there is no reason to believe that it will
not cause similar problems in the future. On that basis alone,
concern for the evil involved is warranted.
C. THE IssuEs
Most authors have characterized the problem of inflammatory
publicity in terms of conflicting constitutional rights-the right
to a fair trial25 pitted against the freedom of the press. 26 While
there is some dissent as to whether this conflict constitutes the
totality of the issue,27 it is generally agreed that the conflict does
22 "Long generations of experience in the criminal law have convinced
us that these things are bad evidence-worse than useless-because
their inflammatory effect is far greater than their contribution to the
quest for truth. Thus, our law refuses to admit them in evidence . . .
Wright, supra note 8, at 1125.
23 Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 52 (1951).
24 38 VA. L. REv. 1057, 1058 (1952).
25 See note 20 supra.
26 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
27 Mueller, supra note 18, at 2. The author says the clash is between the
right of the citizen to complete and intelligent information and the
right to be free from detriment through crime. Wright also speaks of
the "right to know." Wright, supra note 8. For an interesting article
dispelling the "right to know" argument, see Will, Free Press vs. Fair
Trial, 12 DE PAur_ L. REV. 197, 201-04 (1963).
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exist and is an important part of the issue.2 8 As Judge Holtzoff
said:
In order to guarantee an absolutely fair trial it would be neces-
sary to eliminate completely any such publicity. On the other
hand, it may be argued that to compel its exclusion might con-
stitute an infringement on freedom of the press. The question is
where to draw the true line.29
The problem is not only where to draw the line, but how to
draw it. Both aspects are discussed in the following section.
III. ANALYSIS OF PAST AND PRESENT SOLUTIONS
A. THE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
In nearly all jurisdictions, there exist certain procedural safe-
guards used to overcome the effects of trial by newspaper. These
safeguards probably have some remedial effect in certain situa-
tions. Nevertheless, it may be demonstrated that in many cases
the safeguards have little effect, and if they do succeed in part,
they cause other undesirable results.
(1) Change of Venue
The theory of change of venue is that removal of a trial from
the locality of the crime will produce greater objectivity and
fairness. However, change of venue may delay the trial unneces-
sarily, cause extra expense to the state or defense, and inconven-
ience all parties connected with the trial.8 0 If venue is changed to
a place distant enough to relieve the effects of massive publicity,
the scene of the crime will probably be out of the reach of the
court during the trial, thereby making it impossible for the judge
and jury to view the scene when this would be desirable.8 1 Since
in many cases only one change of venue may be granted -3 2 and the
28 The right to a fair trial, as set forth in the sixth amendment, includes
'the right to a speedy trial, an impartial trial, and a public trial. There
has been much discussion of whether the right to a public trial is a
right reserved to the defendant, which may be waived by him if he
so desires, or a right of the public to witness criminal trials under all
circumstances. The cases on record have gone both ways. See Freed-
man, supra note 8, at 398.
29 Holtzoff, Opening Remarks of Moderator to Panel Discussion on Fair
Trial and Freedom of the Press, 19 F.R.D. 16, 18 (1957).
30 Note, 63 HARv. L. R.v. 840, 844 (1950).
81 Gelb, Fair Trials and Free Speech, 31 GEO. WAmSH. L. REV. 607, 612
(1963).
82 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
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trial judge may be limited in his discretion in selecting a new
place for the trial,33 change of venue may have little effect on
prejudicial publicity. Finally, it is questionable whether even
unlimited change of venue would solve the problem because of
state-wide and nation-wide news media which could make it im-
possible for a fair trial to be held anywhere in the country.3 4
(2) Continuance
The continuance, or postponement of trial, is supposed to
allow a "cooling-off period" during which publicity diminishes and
public sentiment subsides, thereby creating a climate more suit-
able for conducting a fair trial. Aside from the fact that a con-
tinuance may be difficult to obtain,35 other inadequacies are ap-
parent. Continuance requires both prosecution and defense to
preserve evidence, to keep prospective witnesses within the juris-
diction, and to keep the testimony of witnesses clear in their
minds.3 6
The Constitution guarantees the defendant the right to both
a speedy and impartial trial. If the defendant resorts to a motion
for continuance, he has, in effect, waived his right to a speedy
trial, though in cases involving trail by newspaper it can scarcely
be said that he has waived this right without strong coercion.
In addition, the mere granting of a continuance is no assur-
ance that prospective jurors will forget what has been written or
33 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1301 (Reissue 1964): "All criminal cases
shall be tried in the county where the offense was committed ...
unless it shall appear to the court by affidavits that a fair and im-
partial trial cannot be had therein. In such a case the court may
direct the person accused to be tried in some adjoining county." (Em-
phasis added.)
34 Nowhere has this fact been so well illustrated as in Dallas following
the assassination of President Kennedy. Publicity was so intense and
public feeling so aroused that had Lee Harvey Oswald ever come to
trial, "it would have been a most difficult task to select an unpreju-
diced jury; either in Dallas or elsewhere." REPORT .OF THE PRESIDENT's
COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KmNiY 238
(1964).
35 Goldfarb, Public Information, Criminal Trials, and the Cause Celebre,
36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 810, 819 (1961). In Nebraska, only the state is given
a statutory privilege of asking for a continuance in criminal cases.
This may be granted only where it is shown that material evidence
exists which is presently unavailable to the state, but there is just
ground to believe that the evidence will be available at the succeeding
term. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1204 (Reissue 1964).
36 Gelb, supra note 31, at 613.
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broadcast, and even if they do forget, there is no assurance that
a new wave of undesirable comment will not be forthcoming as
the new trial date approaches.
(3) Voir Dire
Another safeguard is the voir dire examination, which in-
volves excusing prospective jurors, either peremptorily or for
cause.
3 7
The question arises as to what constitutes sufficient cause or
prejudice to warrant a prospective juror's being excused. Ameri-
can courts have not imposed a standard of absolute impartiality.
Exposure of a juror to prejudicial publicity, or even the disclosure
of a preformed opinion, will not disqualify him if he believes he
can put aside his prejudices and decide the case on the basis of the
evidence presented.38 This is not meant to imply that jurors
dishonestly refuse to admit their prejudices on voir dire. Rather,
the argument is that voir dire may be unable to discover the
subconscious prejudices of which the juror himself is unaware.3 9
So long as inflammatory publicity persists, any attempt to
improve the effectiveness of voir dire by requiring absolute im-
partiality would be to set an "impossible standard"40 and further
inhibit the judicial process through delay in selecting jurors.
(4) Reversal and Mistrial
If publicity becomes so intense and prejudicial that a fair
trial is impossible, the judge may declare a mistrial. Also, ap-
pellate courts may review convictions and reverse and remand
them, if it is found that publicity caused an absence of due
37 See, e.g., NE. REV. STAT. § 29-2005 (Reissue 1964), which allows twelve
peremptory challenges for the defense. in a case involving the death
sentence or life imprisonment, six in cases with sentences exceeding
eighteen months, and three for all others. Peremptory challenges
allowed to the prosecution are the same except for crimes punishable
by life sentence or death, where only ten are allowed.
38 "It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and
render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court." Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961). NFB. R.v. STAT. § 29-2006 (Reissue
1964), provides that, if the preformed opinion of a juror is "founded
upon reading newspaper statements, communications, comments or
reports, or upon rumor or hearsay," the juror may be selected none-
theless, if he feels able to render an impartial verdict based on the
evidence presented.
39 Gelb, supra note 31, at 611-12.
40 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 44, No. 3
process.4 1 Since the result of both these measures is to require
a new trial, their effectiveness is compromised by some of the
objections applicable to procedures already discussed-added ex-
pense, delay, inconvenience, and the difficulty- of keeping evi-
dence and witnesses fresh. In addition, another shortcoming is
apparent. If a case is reversed on appeal because of a faulty rul-
ing by the trial judge, or because of the conduct of attorneys
prior to or during the trial, the reversal has the effect of penaliz-
ing the party who was in error and forcing him to do his work
again.4 2  However, when a conviction is reversed because of
prejudicial publicity there is no such sanction on the offending
news media. The only result is that the news media have another
trial to publicize. The penalty falls upon the defendant and the
general public, who both lose their right to have criminal justice
speedily and impartially administered. Such reversals are "an ex-
pedient and not a cure. ' 43
B. CONSTRUCTIVE CONTEMPT BY PUBLICATION
(1) The English Rule
Much has been written of the power of English courts to
punish newspapers for inflammatory and prejudicial reporting of
criminal trials by citations for constructive contempt. 44 No at-
tempt will be made here to discuss this power in detail. It is
enough to acknowledge that the power does exist, and that it is
based generally upon the famous words in Roach v. Garvin:
"There may be also a contempt of this court, in prejudicing man-
kind against persons before the cause is heard. '45
41 For discussion of what constitutes an absence of due process, see dis-
cussion in H(C) infra.
42 Will, supra note 27, at 209-10.
43 State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 387, 204 A.2d 841, 851 (1964).
44 The power of the courts to punish acts which are offensive to them
is known as the contempt power. There are two categories of con-
tempt-civil and criminal. Civil contempt involves disobedience to
an express order of the court entered in a particular case. Criminal
contempt involves acts which undermine the discipline and efficiency
of judicial authority. Criminal contempt may be of two kinds: (1)
direct contempt, which includes acts committed in the presence of the
court; and (2) indirect or constructive contempt, which encompasses
acts not committed in the presence of the court. Contemptuous news
reporting of criminal cases is "contempt by publication," a form of
constructive contempt. Oliver, Contempt by Publication, 27 Mo. L.
REv. 171, 173-74 (1962).
45 2 Atk. 469, 471, 26 Eng. Rep. 683, 685 (Ch. 1752).
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Since England has no unequivocal guarantee of freedom of
speech and press comparable to our own, discussion of the success
of the English rule would be only marginally helpful.46
(2) Contempt by Publication in the United States
This century has seen a great change in the power of the
courts to punish newspapers for contempt by publication. In
1918, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the conviction
of a newspaper and its editor for contempt by publication.47
The Court held that, in determining whether the contempt power
could be used to override the freedom of the press, "the reason-
able tendency of the acts done to influence or bring about the
baleful result is the test."48  Publications could be found to be
contemptuous "without reference to the consideration of how far
they may have been without influence in a particular case. '" 49
The "reasonable tendency" test was overruled in Nye v. United
States.50 Since Nye was a federal case, the decision raised ques-
tions as to the Court's attitude toward the constructive contempt
power of state courts.
The questions did not remain unanswered for long. In
Bridges v. California,51 the Court adopted the "clear and present
danger" test and declared itself the final judge of what consti-
tuted a clear and present danger, which would be determined by
examining the facts of each case.52  In Pennekamp v. Florida53
46 For two illuminating discussions of the constructive contempt power
in England which reach different conclusions about its effectiveness
and popularity, see Goodhart, Newpapers and Contempt of Court in
English Law, 48 HAiv. L. REv. 885 (1935); Laski, Procedure for Con-
structive Contempt in England, 41 HAmv. L. Rsv. 1031 (1928).
47 Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
48 Id. at 421.
49 -Ibid.
G0 313 U.S. 33 (1941). The case involved an allegedly contemptuous act
which took place one hundred miles from the court. It was held that
§ 268 of the Judicial Code, which authorized federal courts to punish
as contempt any act "so near thereto as to obstruct the administration
of justice," applied only to acts committed in the vicinity of the court
and not to those which had a reasonable tendency to obstruct justice.
Id. at 45 n.10.
51 314 U.S. 252 (1941). This case involved an editorial denouncing two
convicts who were up for probation and a published telegram criticiz-
ing a judge's decision.
52 "We must therefore turn to the particular utterances here in question
and the circumstances of their publication to determine to what ex-
tent the substantive evil of unfair administration of justice was a
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and Craig v. Harney,54 the Court reiterated its position that a clear
and present danger to the administration of justice, as determined
by the Court itself, was the only circumstance in which a state
court could foreclose the freedom of the press by punishing pub-
lications for constructive contempt.
The clear and present danger rule has greatly limited the
power of state courts to punish constructive contempts by publi-
cation. First, the clear and present danger test is certainly more
stringent than the reasonable tendency test. Second, the fact that
the Supreme Court decides in each case whether a clear and
present danger did exist leaves the trial judge with no established
and precise standards upon which to base a contempt action.
Third, even if constructive contempt convictions are upheld by
the Court in some instances, the case-by-case approach provides
little deterrent effect, since the news media are not put on ade-
quate notice of exactly what is or is not a contemptuous publica-
tion.
Since the cases discussed did not involve juries, the question
whether the Court will take a different approach to jury trials
remains unanswered. 55 This question could have been resolved
recently in the case of Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc.,56
but the Court denied certiorari. There is no reason to believe
that a different test will be used in jury cases.57 Perhaps the
likely consequence, and whether the degree of likelihood was sufficient
to justify summary punishment." Id. at 271.
53 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
54 331 U.S. 367 (1947). In this case, the state appellate court applied the
test enunciated in Bridges and determined that a clear and present
danger did exist. The Supreme Court examined the record and re-
versed.
55 See GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 98 (1963).
56 338 U.S. 912 (1950). Four radio stations were found guilty of con-
tempt for broadcasting certain news dispatches relating to the ac-
cused in a murder case. The defendant in the murder trial elected
to waive his right to a jury trial because of inflammatory publicity.
In the contempt trial, the court found that the broadcasts had created
an obstruction of justice by forcing defendant to waive jury trial. Had
the Supreme Court granted certiorari, it would have been necessary
to determine whether the broadcasts so prejudiced the prospective
jurors as to warrant punishment for contempt.
57 This is not to say that the Court will always maintain the clear and
present danger test as the standard, but rather, that there is no reason
to believe that it will apply different tests to judges and juries.
In Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), the Court said the
test should be whether the gravity of the evil discounted by its im-
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Court will be more likely to find, as a matter of fact, that a clear
and present danger exists when justice is in the hands of twelve
laymen than when it is administered by a judge. Even then, the
deterrent effect of the contempt power will still be limited by the
case-by-case approach.
C. THE UNiTED STATES SUPREmE COURT AN THE "FAno TRIAI[" RuILE
The Supreme Court has been called upon several times to
review state criminal convictions because of inflammatory pub-
licity arising from out-of-court activities. The Court has based its
decisions on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
which guarantees the defendant a fair trial. In Stroble v. Cal-
ifornia, s the Court affirmed the conviction because the defendant
was unable to show either that particular jurors had been preju-
diced or that newspaper stories had aroused such community
prejudice as to necessarily prevent a fair trial. That the defend-
ant had not attempted to use procedural safeguards, such as
change of venue, was said to be significant but not dispositive.
probability justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to
avoid the danger. This apparent adoption of a clear and probable
danger test has been said to be a retreat from the clear and present
danger test because it minimizes the requirement that the danger be
immediate. Comment, 64 CoLum. L. REv. 81 (1964). Thus, it is pos-
sible that the clear and present danger test will not always obtain.
Some authors think that the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his
concurring opinion in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), forecast ex-
pansion of the contempt power in jury cases. He said: "The court
has not yet decided that, while convictions must be reversed and mis-
carriages of justice result because the minds of jurors or potentialjurors were poisoned, the poisoner is constitutionally protected in
plying his trade." While this implies that news media may be pun-
ished for prejudicial publications, it should be kept in mind that Mr.
Justice Frankfurter long held such a view. He dissented in Bridges
and Craig and concurred in Pennekamp only because he thought the
inflammatory publicity came forth after the vital decisions of the trialjudge had been made. In contrast, Mr. Justice Black has continually
urged that criminal sanctions not be applied to the news media. Jus-
tice Black and the First Amendment--"Absolutes": A Public Interview,
37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 569 (1962), in WEsTIN, AN AUTOBIOGRAPELY OF THE
SuPlmE COURT 401, 407 (1963). Mr. Justice Douglas has proposed
greater use of the procedural safeguards. Douglas, Public Trial and
Free Press, 46-A.B.A.J. 840, 841 (1960). Mr. Justice Goldberg has
suggested that self-restraint by news media would be most helpful.
Goldberg, Freedom and Responsibility of the Press, in AwmRIcAN SocIE-
TY OF NEwsPAPER EDITORS, 1964 PROBLEMS OF JOURMALISM 50.
s8 343 U.S. 181 (1952). The district attorney released details of a con-
fession to the press.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 44, No. 3
In Irvin v. Dowd,59 the defendant was granted one change of
venue to an adjoining county, but additional motions for change of
venue and continuance were denied. Voir dire revealed that
ninety per cent of the prospective jurors had some opinion about
the defendant's guilt. Eight of those selected had preformed
opinions, but said they could lay them aside. The Court reversed
because of the "pattern of deep and bitter prejudice" in the
community, which was "clearly reflected in the sum total of the
voir dire examination" and which caused the Court to give little
weight to statements of impartiality by jurors.60
The most liberal application of the fair trial rule appears in
Rideau v. Louisiana.61 The Court reversed the conviction without
seeking specific examples of prejudice or examining the voir dire
transcript for evidence of a reflection of overwhelming public
hostility. The majority held that due process required a jury to
be drawn from a community of people who had not seen and
heard defendant's televised confession.62
What emerges from these cases is that the Court will reverse
state convictions because of inflammatory publicity if: (1) there
is a showing of actual prejudice among jurors which influenced the
outcome of the trial; (2) there is sufficient evidence of over-
whelming community hostility so as to rebut statements of im-
partiality by jurors;63 or (3) publicity is so inflammatory that a
conclusion of "unfairness" is mandatory.
Recently, the Court has held that, in state criminal cases,
denial of the right to counsel6 4 and the privilege against self-
incrimination65 are prejudicial per se. These decisions, coupled
with the liberal holding in Rideau, may indicate that the Court is
willing to declare certain kinds of publicity unfair per se, where
59 366 U.S. 717 (1961). The police and prosecutor released a statement
saying the defendant had confessed. This and other statements about
the defendant's past criminal record received wide publicity.
60 Id. at 727.
61 373 U.S. 723 (1963). A sound movie of the defendant confessing to
the sheriff was shown on local television stations. A motion for change
of venue was denied. Jurors who had seen the telecast were chal-
lenged for cause, but three of them were finally selected for the jury.
62 Id. at 727.
63 What constitutes sufficient evidence is a question as yet not answered
very precisely. See Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962), where
a showing of preformed opinion among slightly more than 25% of the
prospective jurors was insufficient to reverse the conviction.
64 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
65 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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the defendant has attempted to use the procedural safeguards.
Nevertheless, this step would not solve the problem, for the most
that the fair trial rule can accomplish is a reversal, and the short-
comings of this procedure have been discussed previously.
IV. SOLUTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN PROPOSED:
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
A. Am nmNT AM/OR ENFORCEMmNT OF CANON 20
There can be little doubt that the bar must share the re-
sponsibility for trial by newspaper. An overwhelming majority
of authors, including lawyers, judges, and newsmen, trace much
prejudicial publicity directly to statements freely given to news
media by lawyers for the parties involved. 6 This conclusion is
reasonable in view of statements in the press that the accused
has confessed, that the case is open and shut, or that the state
does not have a shred of evidence. The content of such statements
suggests that they are given by attorneys in the case.
One author has stated that it is futile to expect news media
to place upon themselves voluntary restraints to which the bar
itself is unwilling to conform. When attorneys in a case issue
statements intended for digestion by the general public, it is
unrealistic to expect reporters to scan the material, to. decide
what portions are legally inadmissible as evidence or legally
prejudicial to the defendant, and to delete such portions from the
published report.67
The bar has a means of restraining its members from making
prejudicial statements. However, from its somewhat casual in-
ception until the Van Duyne decision, Canon 20 has been in-
effective in solving the problem of trial by newspaper." Per-
haps part of the difficulty stems from the language of the canon
itself, which says that comments by attorneys on pending litiga-
tion are "generally condemned" but may be made in "extreme
66 See, e.g., PILips & McCoy, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERs 179
(1952); Allen, Fair Trial and Free Press, 19 F.R.D. 36 (1957); Freed-
man, News Media Coverage of Criminal Cases, 40"NEB. L. REV. 391, 410(1961); Wright, A Judge's View: The News Media and Criminal Jus-
tice, 50 A.B.A.J. 1125, 1126 (1964); Pound, Editorial Notes, 3 ILL. L. REV.
231, 233-34 (1909).
67 Wiggins, The Press and Conflicts of Interests, 24 FED. B.J. 358, 361 (1964).
68 Canon 20 was adopted by separate motion without discussion. 33
A.B.A. REP. 85 (1908).
69 See note 7 supra.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 44, No. 3
circumstances. 7 0  This equivocal language has not been clarified
by the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances.7'1 As a
result, there have been several attempts to amend or clarify Canon
20 in the hope of setting forth more clearly the duties incumbent
upon the members of the bar. The most definitive of these
efforts is State v. Van Duyne, where the court carefully delin-
eated the various types of statements it considered banned by
Canon 20.72 The New York State Bar Association has taken
salutary action in adopting an amended Canon 20 which is more
explicit than the present canon.7 3 The Philadelphia Bar Associa-
tion is now experimenting with a self-imposed plan of silence
during criminal trials,7 4 and the American Bar Association has
taken action which may lead to amendment on a national scale.7 5
70 Roscoe Pound, commenting upon section 17 of the Alabama Code of
Legal Ethics, upon which the present Canon 20 is based, said: "It is
submitted that the provision of the Alabama code is insufficient to
meet this rapidly-growing evil .... [I]t is to be hoped that provi-
sions of the Code of the American Bar Association on this point will
be unequivocal and vigorous." Pound, Editorial Notes, 2 ITL. L. REv.
398, 401 (1908).
71 A.B.A. Op. 199 (1940) deals with Canon 20, but only with respect to
statements emanating from the office of the United States Attorney
General. It does not define the limits of comment. One author states
that the failure of the committee to spell out Canon 20 indicates either
that the language is so clear as to cause no problems in compliance
or so narrow and ambiguous as to be unrealistic. He then adopts the
latter conclusion. Note, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 412, 418-19 (1962).
72 See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
73 The amended canon, quoted in Freedman, News Media Coverage of
Criminal Cases, 40 NEB. L. REV. 391, 410 (1961), prohibits release to
news media of any statement of opinion or alleged fact which is in-
tended to or may interfere with a fair trial. The attorney has the right
to reply to any public statement which adversely affects his client so
long as the reply is factual and does no more than mitigate the effect
of the prior statement. Other New York groups have advocated even
more definitive action. The New York City Bar Association Commit-
tee on Bill of Rights has set forth areas of prohibited comment similar
to those in Van Duyne. This approach is quoted in TRUMBULL, MATE-
RIALS oNi THE LAwYER's PROFEssioNAL RESPONSIBILrrY 199 (1957). The
New York County Lawyer's Association has also advocated an amend-
ment which explicitly states forbidden areas of comment. AMERICAN
BAR FOuNDATION, MEmo No. 33, FAIR TRL&--FREE PRESS 19 (1964).
74 Pompert, Law and Press, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1965, § 4, p. 9, cols. 1-4
(city ed.).
75 At the annual meeting in August, 1964, the House of Delegates ap-
proved a special committee to modernize the Canons of Ethics. One
proposed amendment referred to the committee is designed to prohibit
statements by attorneys about their opinions of the guilt or innocence
of the defendant. Am. Bar News, Sept. 15, 1964, p. 4.
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Even more important than amendment, however, is the en-
forcement of Canon 20. There is no doubt that the canons can
be enforced, if the bar is willing to institute disciplinary pro-
ceedings.7 6 It is also likely that the enforcement of Canon 20
need not be limited to cases in which statements by attorneys
cause actual prejudice to the trial.-
The advantages of using Canon 20 as a solution to the prob-
lem of trial by newspaper are obvious. First, this approach
strikes at one of the principal sources of prejudicial information.
Thus, the effect of enforcement should be to deter future viola-
tors, rather than only to remedy the immediate harm done by
past violations. Second, the controversial issue of free speech
and press is avoided. The news media will be unable to publish
prejudicial material if their sources of information are silenced.
While they have a constitutional freedom to publish nearly every-
thing they know about a criminal case, there is no constitutional
guarantee of access to information which attorneys choose not to
disclose. Third, the enforcement of high standards by the bar
will put the legal profession in a better position to persuade news
media and police that they should adopt similar standards and
will hopefully result in significant emulation. Fourth, and most
idealistically, this approach is the most honorable, probably re-
flects the desires of a majority of the bar, and best illustrates
the overall integrity of the profession.
B. SELF-RESTRAINT BY NEWS MEDIA
The suggestion that news media adopt rules for self-restraint
is certainly not new, nor can it be said that no steps have been
taken to develop such a plan. In 1923, the American Society of
Newspaper Editors adopted Canons of Journalism.7" Canons on
"responsibility" and "decency" deal tangentially with trial by
newspaper, but expressly recognize the lack of enforceability of
the canons. These canons are still acknowledged by the Society
of Editors,7 9 but there is no record of their approval by the
76 See e.g., State ex rel. Nebraska Bar Ass'n v. Fisher, 170 Neb. 483, 103
N.W.2d 325 (1960) (attorney suspended for tampering with evidence
at trial in violation of Canons 15, 22, and 32); State ex rel. Nebraska
Bar Ass'n v. Richards, 165 Neb. 80, 84 N.W.2d 136 (1957) (attorney
suspended for perpetration of fraud upon heirs in his capacity as
administrator in violation of Canons 29, 11, and 12).
77 Ibid. Both cases indicate that disbarment or suspension may result
even though the conduct caused no actual damage.
78 Otterbourg, Fair Trial and Free Press, 39 A.B.A.J. 978, 1022 (1953).
79 The canons are printed each year in the organization's annual publi-
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American Newspaper Publishers' Association.80
In 1937, following the Lindbergh Kidnapping Case, a com-
mittee of six attorneys, seven publishers, and five editors was
formed to study the problem of publicity interfering with the
fair trial of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.8' The com-
mittee report contains an extensive list of suggestions for alleviat-
ing the problem. The committee was continued for another year
and its next report recommended the establishment of a standing
committee of the American Bar Association on cooperation be-
tween the bar and news media.8 2 It appears that no action was
taken on the recommendation at that time.
These and other examples8 3 illustrate that it is possible for
the bar and the news media to confer and to agree on certain
principles of reporting and commenting on criminal proceedings.
In Massachusetts and Oregon, bar-press committees have been
established and have developed tentative statements of principles
governing the mutual responsibilities of lawyers and news media
in reporting crime.8 4 The remaining problem is to transform the
written principles into standards of actual conduct.
Former United States District Judge Simon H. Rifkind has
proposed that, after a code of conduct has been agreed upon, both
the bar and the news media establish "watch-dog" committees to
cation, Problems of Journalism. See Goldberg, Freedom and Respon-
sibility of the Press, in AMERICAN SociETY Or NEWSPAPER EDITORS, 1964
PROBLEMS OF JOURNALISM 50, where Mr. Justice Goldberg recommends
that the canons be clarified and made more specific in order to help
solve the problem of trial by newspaper.
80 Otterbourg, supra note 78, at 1021.
81 Special Committee on Cooperation Between Press, Radio and Bar, Re-
port as to Publicity Interfering with Fair Trial of Judicial and Quasi-
Judicial Proceedings, 62 A.B.A. REP. 851 (1937). Perhaps the failure of
the suggestions to take root is attributable to the fact that many of
them were tailor-made to fit the unusual happenings in the Lindbergh
case and thus lacked universality. For instance, the committee sug-
gested prohibitions on the taking of a popular referendum as to the
guilt or innocence of the defendant and on vaudeville acts featuringjurors or court officers.
82 Special Committee on Cooperation Between Press, Radio and Bar, Re-
port as to Publicity Interfering with Fair Trial of Judicial and Quasi-
Judicial Proceedings, 63 A.B.A. REP. 382 (1938).
88 See Staff Report, Fair Trial-Free Press Conference, 10 BAR BULL. 170
(1953), for details of a conference held by the New York County
Lawyer's Association in March, 1950.
84 Wright, A Formula of Voluntary Restraints Is Needed, The Quill, Vol.
52, Feb., 1964, p. 9.
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enforce the code through suggestion and moral persuasion. 5 Such
an arrangement might be a significant step toward solving the
problem.
Although much has been said of the inability of the news
media to enforce any code of conduct which might be adopted,
perhaps such inability should not be conceded without further
study. While it is true that the news media may not enforce
their ethical standards through the courts as does the bar, the
news media are very much organization oriented. For example,
the American Newspaper Publishers' Association is comprised of
about five hundred leading publishers. The organization assists
its members with problems of freight handling and mechanical
efficiency, acts as the official representative in collective bargain-
ing with labor unions, and maintains a collection service and
information department for the sole benefit of its members.86
Likewise, the American Society of Newspaper Editors has a mem-
bership of over five hundred and deals with current problems of
editorship.87 Assuming that these and other news media organi-
zations are presently providing some benefit to their members,
suspension of membership is a possible means of enforcing stand-
ards of conduct adopted by the organization. While such action
might not have as strong an effect as disciplinary action by the
bar, it would deprive offenders of organizational benefits and
would evince a willingness to pay more than lip service to the
adopted standards.
Self-restraint by the news media, in cooperation with the bar,
should yield the same results as enforcement of Canon 20. Both
are basically deterrent rather than remedial because they strike
at the source rather than the effects of the problem. Both avoid
the issue of free speech and press. Even though this solution
may be difficult to implement, an attempt is necessary, for the
alternatives are no more palatable. The Van Duyne case indicates
that courts are becoming impatient with both press and bar and
will not wait indefinitely for these groups to take action. In
Judge Rifkind's words: "[I]f we do not experiment with a mild
dose of self-regulation, we are bound to get a much more corrosive
dose of legislation or judicial legislation."88
85 Rifkind, Conflict Between Press and Justice, 11 BAR BuLL. 12, 17 (1953).
86 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 796 (1946).
87 For membership list and examples of problems discussed, see AamacAN
SocIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS, 1964 PROBLEMS OF JOURNALISM.
88 Rifkind, supra note 85, at 17.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 44, No. 3
C. CRIvINAL STATUTES
Proposals have been made recently for the adoption of crimi-
nal statutes to deal with the problem of trial by newspaper.8 9
Essentially, these seek to punish the publication by news media, or
the divulgence by those connected with law enforcement, of in-
formation which is prejudicial to a fair trial. Aside from minor
criticisms,90 the principal problem with these statutes is the in-
evitable confrontation of the constitutional rights of fair trial and
free speech and press. Any criminal statute in this area would
necessarily have to establish legislatively certain kinds of infor-
mation which, if published or divulged, constitute a clear and
present danger per se. However, as previously discussed, 91 the
Supreme Court has consistently held that it alone is the final
judge of what constitutes a clear and present danger in a given
situation. Even if the Court were to adopt a different test, there
is little indication that it would be willing to allow a state legis-
lature to determine what publications conform to the test.
It might be argued, by analogy to past rulings on obscenity,
that inflammatory statements and publications are a special kind
of speech not protected by the Constitution. However, the Court
has already expressly rejected such an argument in Bridges v.
California.92
89 See, e.g., Will, Free Press vs. Fair Trial, 12 DE PAuL L. REv. 197, 211
(1963); 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 217, 250 (1962); 33 U.S.L. WEE= 2323-24
(1964).
90 Generally, these statutes do not cover second or third trials arising
out of the same criminal act, publicity during the period of appeal,
or retrials of a reversed conviction.
In dealing with statutes which punish divulgence of prejudicial
information, it should be noted that twelve states now have statutes
granting to news media a privilege of nondisclosure of confidential
news sources. In these states, the privilege statutes would have to be
repealed, if proof of divulgence would be possible. See Note, 61 MIcH.
L. REv. 184 (1963).
Also, with regard to the past criminal record of the defendant, it
is difficult to see how divulgence or publication could be punished,
since this information is ordinarily available to anyone who is willing
to search court records. Query: How can persons be punished for
revealing to the public information to which the public already has
access?
91 See notes 51-54 supra and accompanying text.
92 314 U.S. 252 (1941). "History affords no support for the contention
that the criteria applicable under the Constitution to other types of
utterances are not applicable, in contempt proceedings, to out-of-court
publications pertaining to a pending case." Id. at 268. In other words,
inflammatory publicity is no different from other speech, and its sup-
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The only indication that a statute punishing divulgence or
publication might be upheld springs from a potentially paradoxi-
cal relationship between the fair trial rule and the clear and
present danger test. If, as discussed earlier, the Court were to
decide that under the fair trial rule certain kinds of publicity are
incompatible with a fair trial per se, then it would be forced to
alter its attitude toward the clear and present danger test. If it
did not, there would arise an anomalous situation in which the
Court could find, on the same set of facts, that publicity pre-
vented a fair trial per se, but that the question of a clear and
present danger was one of fact to be determined by the Court it-
self on the basis of all the circumstances. While this is an argu-
ment that the Court will allow statutes which classify certain
kinds of speech or publication as per se a clear and present dan-
ger, it is an equally strong argument that the Court will avoid
the anomaly by refusing to classify publicity of certain types as
prejudicial per se under the fair trial rule. Since it is impossible
to say that the same publicity: (1) was prejudicial per se; and
(2) may not have created a clear and present danger to the ad-
ministration of justice, it is more likely that the Court will decline
to hold that material is prejudicial per se, in view of its past in-
sistence on being the final judge of what constitutes clear and
present danger.
Assuming, nevertheless, that a criminal statute could be
passed which would meet constitutional standards and yet be com-
prehensive enough to deal with the problem, the statutory solu-
tion has one principal advantage over voluntary restraint. It
could apply to police and private citizens not connected with law
enforcement as well as to the press and bar. In this way, preju-
dicial statements and opinions of witnesses, friends and enemies
of the defendant, and aroused citizens could be controlled.
V. CONCLUSION
All three of the proposed solutions have merit. All three seek
to solve the problem of inflammatory publicity arising from out-
of-court statements by directing their attention to the source of
the problem-those who divulge and publish the information.
While the statutory method appears to be the quickest way to
reduce the incidence of trial by newspaper, the constitutional
difficulties which would be encountered tend to reduce its appeal.
The voluntary, internal method of self-restraint by news media
pression or punishment must be judged by the same standards as other
speech, such as the clear and present danger test.
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and bar avoids the constitutional issue of fair trial versus free
speech and press, but is undoubtedly more difficult to enforce.
In the final analysis, the ultimate choice of methods rests
with the bar and news media. Failure on their part to solve their
own problems could result in changes of attitude toward consti-
tutional questions which would allow the adoption of criminal
statutes. As the court stated in Van Duyne:
An answer to problems such as are presented here must be
achieved. Fair criminal prosecution and exercise of the guaranty
of a free press are not incompatible with the constitutional right of
a defendant to a fair trial by an impartial jury. Only the will to
recognize and to subscribe responsibly to the fact has been lack-
ing.93
Donald F. Burt '66
03 State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 390, 204 A.2d 841, 852-53 (1964).
